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This paper studies a simple monetary policy game that allows for multiple equi­
libria in the private sector's price expectation formation process. The effects of 
monetary policy then vary with the convention that coordinates the expectations 
of private agents. The role of credibility is shown to depend critically on the domi­
nant convention; for instance, a “tough” reputation can be counterproductive if an 
“opposing” convention is in force. In such a situation, the optimal government pol­
icy under precommitment equals the high inflation policy that was the suboptimal 
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The “Rational Expectations Revolution” in macroeconomics has given rise to an extensive 
literature on the strategic aspects of economic policymaking. Barro and Gordon (1983) 
[henceforth BG] popularized the game-theoretic analysis of a simple model o f monetary 
policy that was introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1977). In this framework an atom­
istic private sector, modelled as a single “representative agent” , forms a unique rational 
expectation of the price level such that the government’s ex ante optimal zero-inflation 
policy is not “ credible” . Some form of precommitment is then advantageous to the gov­
ernment, since it makes it possible to lower the rate of inflation without affecting output1.
Despite the intuitive appeal of this framework, however, the concepts of “credibility” 
and “reputation” are not unambiguous, and doubts have been raised concerning the ro­
bustness of the BG results. In a recent paper, Cubitt (1992) argues that precommitment 
can be counterproductive if the private sector consists of a single strategic agent, for ex­
ample a monopolistic labour union, whose preferences differ from the government’s.
This paper draws a much stronger conclusion: even if the private sector consists of 
atomistic agents and shares the objectives of the government, precommitment may be 
counterproductive. We obtain this result by allowing explicitly for the possibility that 
a policy game may have multiple equilibria when the private sector consists of a large 






zero inflation high inflation (x  — £ /2) 
high inflation, unless zero inflation unless output is 
initial inflation is lower: at full employment level and 
x =  M m {x 0,£ /2A } x0 < £/2A; x =  x0 otherwise
Table 1: Optimal Monetary Policy in Alternative Models.
JThis idea was first expressed by Kellner (1976): if private agents believe the government’s 
announcement of a disinflationary policy they will adjust their inflationary expectations, so that 
a credible disinflation has a stronger effect on prices and a less negative effect on output and 
unemployment than a non-credible one. Subsequent authors have by and large adopted the BG 
framework, focusing on the role of a policymaker’s “reputation” as a credible precommitment 
device. For a comprehensive survey of the literature, see Blackburn and Christensen (1989), or 
Persson and Tabellini (1990).
2ln this table x represents the rate of inflation, f  is the weight given to output relative to 




























































































Our aim is twofold: first, to question the standard concept of credibility, which we 
show to be essentially connected to the assumption that there exists a unique optimal 
government policy. Second, to formulate a new approach to disinflation policy which 
contradicts the conventional wisdom that a “tough” central bank reputation is always 
preferable and which offers an alternative explanation o f real world disinflation experiences.
It has often been noted that the empirical relevance of the credibility literature has 
so far been extremely limited3. This should not be too surprising since the standard 
BG framework is based on a simple “Lucas supply” model o f monetary policy, that is, 
on an expectations-augmented Phillips-curve with a unique natural rate of output. The 
initial findings by Barro (1977) in support of this theory have been contradicted by a 
significant body of evidence: the consensus view now explicitly rejects the notion that 
only unanticipated money affects real variables4 5. Moreover, it is increasingly being argued 
that demand shocks may also have permanent effects on output and unemployment0. If 
this is true, the idea of a unique natural rate that is essential to the BG model is erroneous 
and the ensuing analysis o f credibility looses its significance. A more realistic approach 
will have to accept the possibility of “multiple equilibria” .
Such a presence of multiple equilibria is not hard to explain. In the BG model the 
private sector is modelled as a single “ representative agent” whose only role is to form 
a unique rational expectation of the future price level. There are many examples in 
economics however, where we would expect an economic agent’s rational expectation of 
a macroeconomic outcome to depend on the expectations of other agents, which in turn 
will depend on their beliefs about the expectations of other agents. Then there exists an 
externality in the expectations formation process of the private sector as a whole, which 
makes it misleading to model this expectation —  and the resulting actions —  as the 
outcome of the rational choice of a single “representative agent” 6. Even if we assume that 
all aggregation problems can be overcome, the existence of this externality makes that the 
private sector’s rational expectation in equilibrium will be non-unique.
The monetary policy model o f this paper takes this expectational externality into ac­
count. It is shown below that the standard “Lucas supply” model forms a very special 
case and that in general the impact of government policy will depend on the convention 
which coordinates private agents’ beliefs about future production and prices. Following
3See, for example, Blackburn and Christensen.
4See Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988)
5See De Long and Summers (1988), who argue that demand shocks affect output asymetrically 
and consequently reject the natural rate hypothesis. Manning (1992) finds evidence for the 
existence of multiple equilibria in the British labour market.
°If we allow for differences in opinion between private agents it is difficult to see that the 
representative agent model makes sense at all. For a concise discussion of the problems connected 




























































































Lewis (1967) we define a convention as “a regularity in behaviour that is both expected 
and self-enforcing: everyone conforms, everyone expects others to conform, and everyone 
prefers to conform given that everyone else conforms” . In game-theory, the role of conven­
tions as a solution to the problem of multiple equilibria in a common interest game has 
been recognized since the pioneering work by Schelling (1960). A standard “real-world” 
example concerns driving on the right-hand side of the road rather than driving on the 
left-hand side: in principle, we are completely indifferent about the side of the road on 
which we drive, but we clearly prefer everyone to drive on the same side. Once we all drive 
on the same side we will expect everyone else to keep on driving on that side and will do 
so ourselves: a convention will have emerged.
What intuition can be offered for the role of conventions in relation to monetary policy?7 
It could be argued that the use of money itself is the outcome of a convention, but for a 
more down-to-earth example consider the reaction of a representative firm in response to a 
decrease in aggregate demand. It may not be profitable for an individual firm to lower its 
prices in response to such a decrease, unless it expects all other firms to lower their prices 
as well. A single firm in a market with a large number of identical other firms may face 
a ‘kinked’ demand curve where due to the presence of search costs incurred by buyers the 
elasticity of demand may be very low below the prevailing market price, so that a lower 
price, ceteris paribus, will hardly raise the demand for a firm's product. If. in this case, 
the government is expected to decrease the money supply, thus also decreasing aggregate 
demand, the effect on prices (and therefore on output) is uncertain: if firms expect other 
firms to lower their prices, they will lower their own prices as well: however, if they expect 
price stability, they will keep the price of their own product constant. The impact of 
economic policy will then depend crucially on the way that agents perceive the behaviour 
of others. A change in the money supply may affect prices, output, or both, depending on 
microeconomic incentives and the convention which coordinates private agent's beliefs.
The question of how conventions evolve has been adressed only very recently in the 
game-theoretic literature8 and in this paper we will abstract from this important problem 
and take the different conventions as given. This does not mean that they are completely 
arbitrary, however. We will compare two conventions: the first ( “ L ''l represents the stan­
dard “ Lucas-supply” framework where there exist a unique “natural rate” of output and 
only unanticipated money has real effects, the second ( “ l)S” ) allows explicitly for expected 
money growth to affect prices, and is subject moreover to a “hysteresis” effect that makes 
the natural rate history-dependent. It will be argued that this second convention gives 
in many respects a more realistic description of the workings of a monetary policy than 
the standard Lucas supply model, and offers an alternative explanation for the disinflation






























































































experiences of industrialized countries in the 1980s.
The main purpose of the paper is however to question “credibility” . The practical 
significance and interpretation of the concept becomes much less clear if private sector ex­
pectations are not uniquely determined, since the optimal credible policy will then depend 
on the prevailing convention in society. If conventions change as microeconomic incen­
tives change, the policymaker may find itself left with the “wrong” reputation. It is thus 
much harder to give a rationale for precommitment, when the possibility exists that policy 
outcomes will be negatively affected.
This problem will be illustrated by comparing disinflation policy under the two different 
conventions outlined above. It is shown that the optimal credible policy in the standard 
BG monetary policy framework is counterproductive if the private sector coordinates its 
beliefs according to the second ( “DS” ) convention. In that case, the government would 
like to precommit itself to a high inflation policy that equals the BG (suboptimal) Nash- 
solution; without precommitment, it will have to implement a costly disinflationary policy. 
These last results are diametrically opposed to the conclusions o f BG, as was shown in 
table 1.
The plan of this paper is as follows: Section 2 develops a simple labour market model 
which provides the basis for the standard BG model. It is shown that a slight modifica­
tion of this model (implicitly allowing for the role of investment) completely changes its 
implications: the impact of government policy will be seen to depend on the convention 
which coordinates private agents’ beliefs. Section 3 shows that under a certain convention, 
monetary policy credibility as originally defined becomes counterproductive. Section 4 
consequently derives the optimal policies under precommitment and under discretion for 
this convention, and discusses the implications of these results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model.
2 .1  T h e  B a s i c  B a r r o - G o r d o n  M o d e l .
Consider the following standard structure9:
I? =  - ( ( “ >( ~ P l) +  «( ( 1)
I', =  *?(«>! -  Pi) (2)
‘ . =  ‘ ‘  =  '? (3)
Vi =  01, 9





























































































V, C > 0; 0 < 0 < 1.
Here la, ld, and l represent logs of labour supply, labour demand and actual employment 
respectively, y is log of output, and p is the log of the price level. Finally, w is the log of 
the nominal wage, and u is an error term which represents shocks to labour demand, that 
is, aggregate supply shocks. Constants are ignored for notational simplicity.10
This is a full market-clearing model; if ut =  0, all real variables are at their unique 
natural rate level: (w^—p't ) =  Z“ =  y" =  0. However, a short-term role for nominal variables 
appears if wage contracts are signed before actual production takes place, so that workers 
agree to supply the amount of labour demanded by firms .it a nominal wage w, specified 
in advance. Full labour market-clearing is then replaced by expected full market-clearing, 
so that (3) has to be substituted by:
wt =  =  £ (i? )] ; l, =  l} (5)
Assuming that E(ut) — 0, this gives:
wt =  ( 6)
where t-iPct =. E(pt\It-1). the rational expectation of the price level formed one period 
ahead by the (representative agent,) private sector.
Production is then given by:
St =  (0(Pt -  (-iP i) +  v, (7)
with v. =  $ut: it is assumed that the price level pt is chosen directly by a monetary 
policymaker.
Rewriting in terms of inflation, n, gives the “Lucas supply function” :
yt =  <0(x ( - ,_ !* ■ ,')  +  v, (8)
Assume that the policymaker has a linear quadratic cost function in n and y for each 
period t:
~ tSu £ > 0  (9)
Assume furthermore for simplicity that vt=  0 for all t. The policymaker minimizes the 
present value of its cost function over a finite number of periods, by choosing a programme 
t =  {^V}!= ( f°r its policy instrument 7rT:
T
min L, =  V ] Atx:t (10 )7Tr T * 
’ T — t
10The labour demand relationship could be derived in the usual way. by equating marginal cost 
and marginal revenue, that is, by setting wt -pt = ln0 + (B— 1)/*. This would add a constant term 
lnO/(0 — 1) to equation (1). Although this constant was left out, (1) should still be considered 




























































































It follows from (2), (8) and (9) that the choice of the optimal policy will depend on the effect 
that the government’s policy instrument (the rate of inflation) has on the private sector’s 
inflationary expectations. As shown by BG, the government’s ex ante optimal policy, 
obtained by minimizing ( 10) under the constraint that t-i^t =  equals =  0,
so that Lt =  0 for all t.
However, since Kydland and Prescott (1977) it has been well-known that this solution 
is time inconsistent if the government is not able to precommit itself. The interaction 
between government and the private sector can be modelled as a finetely repeated game 
under complete information that has a unique subgame perfect solution under discretion. 
It follows that:
«-!< = C0f/2 = ST,
is the optimal credible policy under discretion for all t.
The government’s discounted costs in this Nash-equilibrium equal:
i ,  =  E A W )2
T — t
This is clearly inferior to the solution under precommitment, a policy of zero inflation.
BG proceed to show that a Pareto-superior solution may be sustained if this game 
has an infinite number of time periods, so that the private sector can play reputational 
trigger-strategies. Subsequent authors, such as Backus and Driffill (1985), Cuckierman 
and Meltzer (1986), and Basar and Salmon (1989), focused on the strategic role of “asym­
metric information” in relation to a government’s reputation. In this paper we will not 
consider such reputational issues and analyze the effects of monetary policy in a finite- 
period framework with complete information.
2.2 An extended model with atomistic agents.
The model above assumed that employment decisions are taken one period in advance but 
that the market-clearing value for the real wage is unique and hence has a unique rational 
expectation. This is a logical consequence of the “ representative agent” model where the 
single representative firm does not face uncertainty about market-clearing since its own 
supply creates demand in the most direct sense. Suppose now that there exist a one-period 
lag in production:
y, =  0l,-1; O < 0 < 1  (11)
Because production takes time, the labour hiring decision is linked to an investment 




























































































changing its demand for labour or by adjusting its capital stock as well. If the economy is 
still assumed to consist of one single firm, this introduction of capital has no consequences 
at all for the working of the model o f section 2.1. Since the 'natural rate’ of output 
reflects the fundamentals o f the economy, that is, the state of the technology combined 
with the relative scarcity of capital and labour, there is no incentive to invest or disinvest 
unless these fundamentals change. Short-term fluctuations in demand only affect labour 
demand, and since there still exists a unique natural rate of output and employment only 
unanticipated monetary policy can have real effects.
Suppose however that the economy consists of a large number of atomistic firms. In this 
case the investment decision of an individual firm no longer takes place in the certainty 
that the fundamentals of the economy are constant. Other firms may have invested or 
disinvested, thus changing the productive capacity of the economy. As a result there exists 
an externality in the investment decision of the private sector: the amount o f investment 
an individual firm undertakes will depend on the amount of investment by other firms. 
Hence there is no unique 'natural rate' of output, employment and the real wage. The 
private sector has to form expectations with regard to both future production and future 
prices. This “ investment externality” is reflected in the equation for labour demand which 
replaces equation ( l ):11
lt ~  tyct+1). ( -C 0(w, -  p ,))} C > 0 (12)
where ty'+i represents the expectations of future production formed in the current 
period. The firm will expect the market-clearing level of output, or less if the consensus 
view that a lower level will prevail holds.
The actual investment decision remains implicit in this argument, but the shape of 
equation ( 12) reflects a situation in which firms face a potentially ‘ kinked’ demand curve. 
The willingness of an individual firm to change prices in response to fluctuations in demand, 
which in this model are exclusively determined by changes in the money supply, will 
then depend on how it perceives the willingness o f other firms to change their prices. 
Since pricing and production decisions are necessarily linked , one can also express this 
phenomenon in terms of output: equation ( 12) in effect states that a firm’s investment in 
future production, through the quantity of labour hired in the current period, depends on 
the expected level of future production, independently of the level of real wages, as long 
as the latter are not “ too high” . This can be understood by considering the shape of an 
individual firm’s marginal cost and marginal revenue curves in figure la. The MC curve 
is simply given by the real wage, the M R curve reflects the presence of search costs on the 
buyers’ side: at the given market price, it does not pay to lower prices (raise output) in 
reaction to a. shift in marginal costs unless one expects others to do so as well.




























































































a. Marginal Cost/Marginal Revenue b. Labour Supply &: Demand
Figure 1: Multiple Equilibria on the Labour Market
Hence a ‘kink’ occurs at the expected level o f production. There is no unique natural 
rate of output since the vertical section of the MR line can shift, producing a whole 
range of equilibria consistent with market-clearing. We will not discuss out-of- equilibrium 
behaviour here, or the microeconomic interactions between firms which lead to one or 
another equilibrium. The focus is on the macroeconomic adjustment of labour demand, 
and it is therefore assumed that some convention exists which coordinates individual firms’ 
beliefs on expected output, so that (12) can be considered the labour demand equation of 
a single “ representative” firm. This labour demand curve is shown, together with labour 
supply, in figure lb. The vertical part of the curve, representing the first term on the right 
hand side of (12), gives labour demand when the economy is expected to operate below 
full employment. This value equals the amount of labour inputs required to produce the 
expected level o f output for the next period and is derived by taking the expectation of 
(11), the production function. 12 With full employment, labour demand is determined by 
the second term on the right hand side, which equals equation (1).
We now complete the extended model by adding a standard demand relationship:
yt =  mt - p t (13)
12 Here it has been assumed that it never pays to operate at excess capacity. Firms take 
negative shocks to output to be permanent, so that labour hoarding is not profitable. This 
is a strong assumption which again is self-fulfilling, but it can be justified by referring to the 
empirical evidence found by De Long and Summers (1988). Moreover, although we will see that 




























































































This relationship was left out for reasons of simplicity in section 2 —  because, in the 
absence of shocks, choosing the money supply in that model amounts to a direct control of 
the price level —  but it must be included here since the level of production is not uniquely 
determined.
We assume that the nominal contract wage is still based on an ex ante belief in market 
clearing and thus given by equation (5), which also defines employment as determined 
by labour demand. However, there is no longer a unique level for the market clearing 
real wage. Instead, the level o f the real wage will depend on the expected level of labour 
demand, so that instead of wt =  t-iPt we can write:
wt = —E(lf\I,-i) + t-iP' ( 14)
V
The shape of (14) follows from the sequential timing of events in this model. It is 
assumed that every period starts with the negotiation o f the contract nominal wage; the 
outcome is therefore dependent on information available from the previous period. The 
policymaker subsequently chooses the money supply, firms then decide on the necessary 
amount of labour, and finally production takes place. Producers thus have information on 
current period money supply when they form their expectations about future production 
and decide how much labour to hire: however, when the nominal wage is specified, this 
information is not available. This gives rise to a well-known “ moral hazard’' type of 
problem: producers may misrepresent their expectations of future production in order 
to extract concessions from the workers. We will neglect this problem here and assume 
that wage determination takes place under full knowledge of the convention that rules 
producers’ expectations —  though not of the actual expectation, which may depend on 
current money supply and prices, variables that are unknown at the moment that labour 
contracts are signed. The precise form of (14), the wage determination equation, will 
therefore vary with the convention in force.
2.3 Conventions.
As should be clear from the preceding discussion, the determination of expectations in 
this model is both crucial and yet to a large extent still arbitrary. Rational expectation 
formation would prescribe the expected price level for the current period to depend on 
all available information at the moment that the expectation is formed, including the 
structure of the model itself. Hence:
t-iPt =  E(Pt\It-i) =  t - i <  -  t-iyet (15)
For the moment treating mt and (_im f as exogenous, this leaves us with the problem of 
finding t-iVt- When we attempt to determine which expectation for future output is con­




























































































not uniquely determine a rational expectations solution to the model. This indeterminacy 
of equilibria can be resolved by means of a convention, that is, any mechanism that serves 
to coordinate private agents’ expectations on a single equilibrium. There exist infinitely 
many possible conventions since the expectational mechanism is completely self-fulfilling 
within certain bounds. The conventional equilibrium can arbitrarily depend on almost 
any exogenous variable and in this sense it is a genuine sunspot equilibrium. On the other 
hand, it is also clear that some conventions make more sense than others. In this model 
the convention could be determined, for instance, by what the prevailing economic theory 
has to say about the relationship between money growth and output. That is the case 
we will consider here, neglecting all other possibly relevant variables such as last year’s 
number of storks, today’s weather forecast, etcetera —  a neglect that can be justified by 
the fact that on evolutionary grounds we would anticipate these conventions to die out. 
We thus concentrate on conventions that determine the extent to which a change in the 
money supply will affect output, and to which it will affect prices.
This still leaves us with a large range of possible conventions, but it also follows from 
the model that not all conventions are possible. It is easily seen, by combining (12) with 
(5), that employment lt can never take a value above lt =  ~C(wt — Pt)- Therefore, taking 
expectations and using (11) we find:
ty't+i < ~C,0(wt -  pt) (16)
From (16) it follows that there exists a “full employment ceiling” which every rational 
convention will have to take into account. We can therefore write a convention in its most 
general form as:
!</«%! =  M in{C ,,S ,} (17)
where
Ct = —Q0(wt — pt), 
the “full employment ceiling” , and:
5, =  S(mt,
the “sunspot variable” which we assume to depend on the money stock.
Now, for reasons of analytical convenience, we will just consider two simple conventions, 
which in some sense form the two extreme cases in this range of rational conventions. As 
mentioned above, these conventions are linked to the conventions on the labour market 
which determine the adjustment speed of nominal wages.
The simplest possible convention is then:




























































































with the corresponding wage equation:
wt = , - i  pet (19)
This convention excludes the possibility of less-than-full-output: agents believe that 
the labour market always clears at a unique real wage level, and as a consequence the 
labour market always clears at this level and output has a unique natural level. This 
would be the unique rational expectation in the model o f section 2.1; hence, just as in 
that model, output is only affected by unexpected changes in the real wage. It can easily 
be checked that if this “Lucas” (L) view of the world prevails, the model is effectively 
identical to the or.e from section 2.1; hence, the economy behaves in exactly the same way 
as in the standard Lucas supply model in that only unexpected changes in the rate of 
money supply can push the economy away from its unique natural rate equilibrium. All 
expected changes in money supply just affect prices.
If, however, it is believed for whatever reason that there is a role for monetary policy and 
that output may not have a unique natural rate level, then expectations could reasonably 
be formed according to:
tUt+i =  Min {C t,(y t +  c.(,mct+j -  m<))} (20)
where m ( =  mt — the percentage increase in nominal money, and ,m '+1 =  tmct+l — mt. 
expected money growth; r is a constant.
The corresponding wage equation is:
W‘ =  y0y' +  ‘~lPt
( 21)
The shape of equation (20) still leaves us with a large range o f possible conventions; in 
fact, if c equals zero we again recover the L convention. Hence, we specify:
c =  0 if ( im ^ ! — m t) >  0; 
c =  1 if (fm '+1 — m () <  0.
This “De Long k. Summers” (DS) convention in effect represents the other extreme 
in the spectrum of possible conventions; a decrease in the anticipated growth rate of the 
money supply is expected only to affect output, and leave prices unchanged. Moreover, 
this immediately leads to the establishment of a new natural rate of output, because 
the asymmetric effect o f demand shocks gives rise to a “hysteresis” effect that makes a 
return to the old natural rate impossible. This may perhaps seem non-rational from a 
collective point of view, but for the individual enterpreneur it can be completely rational. 
If one expects others to form their expectations according to the DS paradigm, aggregate 




























































































Therefore, it is optimal to act in the same way as others and to reduce one’s demand for 
labour permanently.
It could of course be argued that the DS convention does not offer a realistic description 
of the way economic agents form expectations about the effect o f monetary policy, but the 
same argument can be put against the L convention which provides the basis for the 
standard “Lucas supply” model. The model with the DS convention has the advantage 
that it does not contradict several well-known empirical phenomena, such as the fact that 
real wages do not behave countercyclically during recessions, and that unemployment is 
“sticky” and its response to shocks asymmetric13. Moreover, we will argue in section 4 
that the DS version of the model performs better in explaining real world di: inflation 
experiences than does the Lucas supply model.
Our first aim remains however to show that a change in convention can entirely change 
the role of credibility in the same model of monetary policy. To that end. we will now 
consider the role of credibility and precommitment in relation to a disinflationary policy 
under the L and the DS convention, respectively.
3 Disinflation policy under alternative conventions.
3.1 The L Convention
Consider the simple case of a disinflationary policy: the government seeks to reduce infla­
tion by lowering the rate of money growth permanently. Suppose that before the initial 
period, f0, all real variables are at their “full employment” natural rate level:
y, =  lt =  =  l* =  o for all t < t0; t/o =  0.
Assume in addition that at t0, when the government’s planning period starts, the rate 
of inflation and money growth are positive. Assume that
m0 =  0, hence p0 =  w0 =  0, but let it0 =  p0 — =  m0 =  A >  0.
Finally assume that the policymaker's current period loss function is still given by 
equation (9).
The optimal rate of money growth under the L convention will be independent from the 
“inherited” rate o f inflation A , since the model under this convention is clearly equivalent 
to the BG model. We already saw that if the policymaker has full credibility (perhaps 
because a form of external commitment is possible) the optimal rate of inflation and money 
growth will then equal zero. Hence, the implemented strategy will be:
13As summarized by Hamermesh (1991): “the dynamic behaviour of employment is asymmetric: 




























































































m, = ,_ ! m\ = (_ , mct =  mt =  7r, =  0 for all t >  t0.
There will be no effect on output: ?/, =  0 for all t. Therefore zt =  0 for all t > to-
If instead no precomrnitment is possible, and the policy takes place under discretion 
with the private sector fully aware of the government’s objectives, then the implemented 
strategy will be:
(_ jmct =  m< =  7T, =  C^f/2 for all t > t0. Again, there will be no effect on output.
Under discretion, a disinflation will thus take place if and only if A > f0£ /2 . Moreover, 
this disinflation will be incomplete and occur without any cost to output.
3.2 The DS convention with precommitment
We will now compare disinflation policy under the L convention with the same policy under 
the DS convention. In order to focus on the role of credibility, we will assume that under 
the DS convention the government implements the zero-inflation strategy that is optimal 
under the L convention. As we will see later, there are basically two cases in which the 
government will implement this policy:
• The government is unaware of the fact that the DS convention prevails and accord­
ingly precommits itself to the optimal zero-inflation policy of the alternative (L) 
convention.
• Initial inflation is not “too low” , so that a zero-inflation policy is the optimal policy 
for the DS convention under discretion.
The first case is obvious: since expectations are formed according to a “private sector 
convention” the government may not be aware of this convention and mistakenly commit 
itself to the optimal policy under the alternative convention. With precommitment, such 
a choice will be perfectly credible.
The second case will be derived in the next section, where we will show that a zero- 
money-growth policy is the optimal policy for a wide range of initial situations under 
common knowledge of the DS convention. That is, if the DS convention prevails, if the 
government knows that this convention prevails, if the private sector knows that the gov­
ernment knows this, and the government knows that the private sector knows etc. etc. . . . ,  
then a zero-inflation policy will be optimal and credible. However, it is not clear that such 
common knowledge should prevail. It is perfectly possible that the government believes 
in the DS convention and announces a zero-inflation policy while in fact the L-convention 
prevails among private agents. In this situation, the announced zero-inflation policy will 
clearly lack credibility since the private sector will expect the government of cheating. 




























































































sector has complete information on the government’s objectives, there is still a credibility 
problem since beliefs may be mutually inconsistent. This problem will disappear once a 
zero-inflation policy has been implemented under the DS convention: in the periods fol­
lowing a period of zero-money-growth, it will always be optimal to stick to a zero-inflation 
policy, independent of the conventional beliefs of both private sector and government. We 
will therefore consider the following two cases:
1. A fully credible zero-money-growth policy; this policy is implemented under discre­
tion if there is common knowledge of the DS convention, and under precommitment 
if the government mistakenly beliefs the L convention prevails.
2. A zero-money-growth policy without credibility in the first period of implementation; 
this policy is implemented under discretion if the government correctly believes that 
the DS convention prevails while the private sector thinks the government believes 
in the L convention instead.
Table 2 gives the effects of the first policy, a fully credible complete disinflation such that: 
mt =t-\ mct = (_ i rhf =  rht =  0 for all t >  f.j
D S : Z ero-in fla tion  P o licy  u nder P recom m itm en t
Variable Period
var to tl *2 tz tT
mt A 0 0 0 0
w, 0 A -  A/e-n A -  A/Oy A -  A/Or/ A — A/Or)
It -A /0 —A/0 -A/0 — A/0 -A IO
Vt 0 - A - A - A —A
Pt 0 A A A A
A A 0 0 0
Zt A2 A2 +  (A tA (,A
Table 2: The effect of a credible disinflation
The fully believed announcement, at to, that future money growth will be zero, im­
mediately affects expectations of future production, and therefore lowers employment. As 
a consequence, production is lower at tt , leaving inflation unaltered. This negative effect 
on production is not temporary: if the government sticks to the pre-announced policy, 
expectations of future production determined by equation (20) will be constant at the new 
level ( —A) and therefore labour demand and output will also be permanently lower. This 




























































































supply, since equation (21) ensures labour-market clearing under perfect foresight. This is 
shown in figure 2: the shift in labour demand from to lg gives a new market-clearing 
real wage of wt — pt =  — A/Or).
Figure 2: The effects of a credible disinflation on the labour market
We conclude that although the government policy eventually succeeds in bringing in­
flation down, it burdens the economy with a permanent cost since the self-fulfilling nature 
o f expectations establishes a new suboptimal natural rate of output.
3.3 The DS convention without initial credibility
We now' want to compare the results above with those of the second policy. The question 
is therefore what happens if the announced zero-inflation policy is not credible initially, 
that is, if money growth expectation are constant in period tg (oiki =  A), but adapt after 
the first period of implementation (t_ im\ =  0 for all t >  /.]) ? The results in this case are 
shown in table 3. The effects initially correspond to those of an unexpected disinflation 
under the L convention: there is a negative effect on output since the real wage is subject 
to an upward shock due to the unexpected fall in money growth. However, under the 
DS convention this effect becomes permanent due to the hysteresis mechanism present in 
the formation of expectations. After period f2 the economy reaches a new natural rate 
equilibrium with market-clearing at a permanently lower level o f output.
The costs o f this policy clearly depend on the value of £0. In the BG framework 
£0 =  1; if this is also the case here an unexpected disinflation will be slightly preferred 
to an expected one, given a discount factor smaller than one. However, it is not obvious 
that the BG situation is the most realistic one. It seems more in line with the mixed 
empirical evidence on the slope of the Phillips curve to assume £0 <  1, so that a one- 




























































































D S: A  Z ero-in flation  P o licy  u nder D iscretion
Variable Period
var *0 11 *2 *3 t j
m, A 0 0 0 0
w, 0 A ( 0 - l-)CA ( 0 - l K A (0 -  l)CA
It 0 - ( A - ( A 1 */-v ~ {A
yt 0 0 - c OA - c  9 A -C  BA
Pt 0 0 C,0A C OA C OA
A 0 C OA 0 0
2( A2 0 A2 +  (0£A C 0ÌA C h a
Table 3: The effect of an initially non-credible disinflation
that case an unexpected disinflation would clearly be preferable to an expected one even 
without discounting, and the effect o f credibility as usually defined, is counterproductive: 
the government is better off without a reputation for “ toughness” . We will assume (0  <  1 
in the rest of the paper.
A precommitment to the ex ante optimal policy under the unique- equilibrium (L) 
convention, which equals the standard “zero inflation” optimal policy of the BG model, 
thus has counterproductive effects if the private sector’s expectations are determined by 
another (DS) convention instead. Moreover, if this policy were to be implemented under 
discretion, the government is actually better-off if it is thought to possess mistaken beliefs! 
In this sense “ credibility” is truly counterproductive under the DS convention.
4 Credible policy under the DS convention.
4.1 Calculating the optimal policy.
In the previous section it was stated that optimal money growth under discretion for the 
DS convention would equal zero in nearly all cases. We will now prove this statement and 
calculate the government’s optimal policy under common knowledge of the DS convention, 
with and without precommitment. Doing so, we encounter an additional problem when 
compared with the standard model. In that model there was a unique natural rate of 
output and unemployment, hence the optimal policy, both ex ante and ex post, depended 
uniquely on the government’s objectives. Now instead there is an infinite number of 
natural rates and the equilibrium of the economy is history-dependent. The optimal policy 
will be history-dependent as well, even if the economy is initially in equilibrium (so that 




























































































well be characterized by suboptimal inflation and output levels and the optimal policy 
consequently will depend on these levels.
Thus, we indicate the value for the ” inherited” rate of inflation by:
t0 =  To o  =  A(A >  0): initial output is given by t/o =  —D(B >  0).
Depending on its objectives, the government may or may not want to change this initial 
situation by changing the value of its policy instrument, mt. Adapting the linear quadratic 
cost function from (9) and (10) to this policy instrument gives the following minimization 
problem:
min =  XT1*t ~  fSb-l (22)
171 t .T  7 ^
where mtj  =  {m}J=t; £ > 0 ,  0 <  A <  1.
So, the monetary policymaker has to choose the path for m . which minimizes its 
discounted losses. It is easy to check that the monetary policymaker cannot raise output if 
the economy is in an equilibrium with a suboptimal level o f production, such as that which 
results after period 2 in table 3; it makes no difference whether its policy announcement 
is credible or not. This is a consequence of the “hysteresis” mechanism implicit in the DS 
convention, caused by the assumption that there is no stockpiling of labour and capital so 
that firms always operate at full capacity. After a downward adjustment, the economy will 
be in a new, full market clearing, ‘natural rate' equilibrium, where output and employment 
are permanently lower, and cannot be raised. This asymmetry in the effect o f monetary 
policy implies that, like in the BG model, the only variable that the policymaker can 
effectively control is the rate of inflation. The initial value for m o(= tt0 =  A) may be 
too high so that it is optimal to choose a lower rate of money growth, but unlike the 
BG model, an expected disinflation will be costly: reducing the rate of inflation will also 
reduce output permanently.
We proceed as follows: first, we derive the optimal policy under precommitment. 
Proposition 1 outlines the cases in which the government would want to disinflate, starting 
from an initial inflation rate of A, and derives the optimal rate of money growth under 
precommitment. Along the lines of the original discussion of the time inconsistency of 
monetary policy in BG, we then drop the assumption that precommitment is possible, 
and assume that the private sector is fully informed about the government's objectives. It 
is then proved, in proposition 2, that an ex ante optimal disinflation policy is always time 
inconsistent, and therefore credibility is an issue. Finally, in proposition 3, we show that 
under common knowledge of the DS convention the optimal credible rate of money growth 
under discretion equals zero in nearly all cases, and that the government will therefore 
be forced to implement precisely the zero-money growth policy discussed in the previous 




























































































4.2 The optimal policy under precommitment.
First consider the effects of a. disinflation policy under precommitment. It is assumed that:
yo =  —B,mo =  —B, hence po =  0, but: xq =  p0 — p_i =  rh0 =  A >  0.
The economy finds itself in a market clearing equilibrium, with the real wage at a 
new natural rate level u>o — po =  — B/yO. For all i >  11 the government implements 
rht =  x*(0 < tt" < A). Because of the precommitment, this policy is fully credible: 
t-iihct =  jt" for all t > i \ .
The results are summarized in Table 4, where F =  B  +  (A — x ") and all other symbols 
are defined as before. This table thus represents a generalized version of table 2, showing 
the effects of a disinflation policy under precommitment. The results are therefore very 
similar: the expected drop in money growth first lowers labour demand, then output and 
finally prices. The fall in output is permanent due to the “hysteresis” mechanism in the 
formation of expectations, and hence there will be a new, suboptimal. natural rate level 
o f output and employment.
Variable
D S: P artia l D isin flation  u nder P recom m itm en t
Period
to 11 t'2 3̂ t-T
1, -T/0 -v / e -T/0 -T/0 -T/0
Vt —B - r - r -T - T
Pi 0 A A +  x" A +  2x- A +  ( T -  l)x*
A A 7T* 7T“
Zt A2 +  ÇB ■42 +  £T x-2 + 1;r X*2 +  f  r x -2 +  f  r
Table 4: The effect o f a partial disinflation under commitment
We can now state the first proposition14:
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that the DS convention applies, that the initial rate of 
inflation equals x0 =  A(A  >  0) and that the government’s loss function is given by (22). 
Then the optimal policy under precommitment equals m, =  x ” =  Min{A,Ç/2A} for all 
t > t  i.
So under the DS convention a disinflation will only take place if the initial rate of 
inflation is not too low, because in that case the cost reduction due to lower inflation will 
not compensate for the losses in output which result from this policy. It is interesting to




























































































compare the ex ante optimal (precommitment) solution under the DS convention to the 
third-best (no commitment) solution under the L convention. As was seen in section 2.1, 
the optimal rate of money growth and inflation in the latter case equalled m, =  - ,  =  (0Ç/2 
for all t. Since 0 <  A <  1 and (6 <  1, the government, under the DS convention, would 
like to precommit itself to an inflation rate which lies above this value.15 This is illustrated 
in figure 3.
^ L i *D S
Figure 3: Optimal Inflation rates under Alternative Conventions
The kinked line it£,s in this figure shows the optimal inflation rate under the DS con­
vention when the government can commit itself: only if the initial inflation rate 7T0 is ‘‘ too 
high" relative to the governments preference variable £ is a disinflationary policy optimal. 
Line Til shows the optimal policy under the L convention when commitment is not possi­
ble: as seen before, this policy is independent of history. Since the optimal policy under 
the DS convention is the result of a largely arbitrary expectation of future production, 
one should not attach to much weight to the relationship between the two outcomes: it is 
largely arbitrary as well. Still, it is worth noting that, due to the pessimistic nature of the 
DS convention, the ex ante optimal policy under this convention will leave the government 
generally worse-off than if it were to implement a suboptimal (Nash-) policy under the L 
convention.
4.3 The optimal policy under discretion.
We have analyzed the optimal monetary policy under the DS convention assuming that the 
policymaker could precommit itself. If this is not possible, will this policy still be credible?
1Dln BG this suboptimal inflation rate equals 7r =  b/a. Rewritten in terms of the model of this 




























































































In answering this question, we maintain our previous assumptions: the private sector has 
complete information about the government’s objectives and the planning period extends 
over a large but finite number of periods.
In the previous section we saw that an unexpected implementation of a zero money 
growth policy under the DS convention has less negative effects on output than a fully 
credible disinflation. Can we extend these results to the kind of “partial disinflation” 
considered in the previous subsection? In other words, is there an incentive to disinflate 
unexpectedly, that is, to implement a rate of money growth that lies below1 the ex ante 
optimal rate under the DS convention? Table 5 gives the results of what happens if the 
private sector initially expects a disinflation with the government setting mt =  tt* for all 
t >  fi, whereas the government instead sets m t =  7r° for all t >  <i, x° <  tt". Again, it is
assumed that the private sector adapts its expectations so that t_i tt° for all t > 12.
(A — x*); all other symbols defined as before.
— D S: P artia l D isin flation  under D iscretion
Variable Period
to tl *2 t-T
u -r /0 -T/0 -r/ 9 - r /0
Vt - B -T -r -r
Pt 0 - °  + A 2t° +  A Tir° +  A
.4 jt° +  A r" 7r°
A2 +  £B (tt° +  A )2 +  £T +  £T a- 2 +  £r
Table 5: The effect of a partial disinflation under discretion
This table suggests that if the government were able to reduce the inflation level un­
expectedly, this could occur without any costs to output: the level o f output equals —T 
for t >  <i, the same value as in table 4. However, this does not mean that the optimal 
(unexpected) level o f money growth equals zero: the crucial assumption underlying Table 
5 that the unexpected reduction in money growth does not push real wages “ too high” , 
so that the demand for labour, and hence production, is determined by the “real wage 
ceiling” (Ct) of equation (20) and not by the “sunspot” variable (St) in the same equation. 
Formally, this requires that G'< <  St: hence:
( - B  +  r  -  A)/0 <  (UvO)B +  C(jt° -  Jr')
It then follows that unexpected money growth should not be too low:
_■>. ( 1 + < * ) » * - > 4  “ (1 + Ch)B




























































































It is easy to see that if x e =  x* =  A and D =  0 it follows that x° >  A. Table 3 thus 
provides an example o f a case in which (23) does not hold: the unexpected increase in real 
wages immediately had a negative effect on employment and production. This is illustrated 
in figure 4: the labour demand curve shifts backwards because of the unexpected rise in 
real wages, shifting the equilibrium to the left as well.
Figure 4: The effects of an unexpected disinflation on the labour market
We can now derive the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that the DS convention is common knowledge, that the 
initial rate o f inflation is Xo =  j4(A  >  0) and that the government's loss function is given 
by (22). Then the ex ante optimal rate of inflation x, =  x" for all t >  ij will not be 
credible under discretion for x" <  A.
Therefore no ex ante optimal disinflation will be credible under the DS convention. 
This does not imply that any ex ante optimal policy is time inconsistent,, since it is still 
possible that under discretion the government would want to stick to the initial rate of 
inflation x0 =  A in cases where the private sector expects it to do so. In other words, it 
may be that the horizontal part of the x/js-line in figure 3 is credible under discretion, 
since the government has no incentive to surprise the private sector with an unexpected 
disinflation. To see this, we first have to consider the case of a larger disinflation than 
allowed for in (23), so that:
(—B +  x " -  A)/0 > ~ D +  C(x° -  x") 
r/0




























































































Ct so that the values for yt and pt in table 5 have to be replaced by:
y, =  f! =  - B +  C0(t° — tt" ) and 7r, =  7r°, for all / >  U\
V
whereas the values for t <  tj are the same as those shown in the table.
We can now state the following corollary16:
COROLLARY 1: Suppose that the DS convention applies, that the initial rate of 
inflation is tt0 =  A(A  >  0), that the government’s loss function is given by (22), and 
that the private sector’s expectation o f money growth equals 0 =  jr" =  ,4. Then the 
government will have an incentive for a “large” disinflation so that (23) no longer holds, 
setting iht =  it° <  tr* for all t > t\ if and only if A >  \£0£/2.
This confirms the intuitive notion that the initial rate of inflation A should be high 
enough in order to make a costly disinflation profitable. We can now derive the following 
proposition;
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that the DS convention is common knowledge, that the 
initial rate of inflation ir0 =  A (A >  0) and the initial level o f output y0 =  —B (B > 0), 
and that the government’s loss function, given by (22), is known to the private sector. 
Then the uniquely credible, subgame perfect, rate of money growth equals ro< =  A for 
A <  and B — 0, and mt =  0 for all other cases, for all /  >  t\.
In an economy where the DS convention prevails, the government will thus be forced 
to disinflate completely in nearly all circumstances, the only exception being a situation 
in which output is maximal (B =  0) and inflation is low (A < xô ) .  At first glance, this 
result is paradoxical: for certain parameter values, the government may want to disinflate, 
but only if this can be done unexpectedly. From Table 4 it follows that a fully expected 
zero-inflation policy will only be welfare-improving if:
E  +  £ )]  A \ A 2 < j z  A” [A2 +  tB]
T — 1 T = 1
This condition is fulfilled if A >  £/2A , independently of the value of B. But from 
above it follows that a full disinflation may also take place if this condition is not fulfilled, 
so that this policy actually decreases current government welfare. The explanation is that 
if the government were not to disinflate, the effect of the private sector’s expectations on 
welfare would be even more negative17: the government therefore has to accomodate its 
monetary policy to the private sector’s expectations.
1GThe proof can be found in the Appendix




























































































4.4 A  discussion of the results.
This section closely followed the procedure of the BG paper: the optimal policy rule 
under commitment was shown to be generally time inconsistent in a model with a finite 
number of periods; and in consequence the unique credible, subgame perfect policy under 
perfect information may be viewed as suboptimal. However, although the procedure was 
comparable, the two different models produce almost exactly opposite policy prescriptions: 
under the L convention, the policymaker would like to commit to a zero inflation rate 
but is forced to infiate instead when credibility is lacking; under the DS convention the 
policymaker would like to commit itself to an inflation rate above zero but is forced to 
implement a costly disinflation. Thus, before choosing its polio, plan, the government 
must be aware of the convention which prevails in society: moreover, it must have the 
certainty that this convention will not change halfway during the planning period since a 
commitment to the wrong policy could be very costly.
Does the DS version of the model offer a realistic, description of real-world disinflation 
experiences? It does seem clear that the results of this section can explain a number 
of empirical phenomena that contradict the Lucas supply theory. It explains why credi­
ble disinflation policies, carried out by conservative governments, could still be extremely 
costly in terms of loss in output and unemployment. It also explains why a government 
would want to implement such a policy in the first place: the costs of not doing so would 
have been even larger. And finally it explains why stabilization policies may have per­
manent effects on output and unemployment: in other words, it allows us to understand 
the hysteresis phenomena which characterized the behaviour of unemployment after the 
disinflation experiences of most West-European countries in the early 1980.
However, it is also clear that the model has several shortcomings. It does not explain 
why conventions should change, and it seems rather simplistic to attribute recent disin­
flation experiences to an arbitrary change in the degree of pessisimism of private agents. 
Part of this criticism could be met by introducing stochastic shocks into the model. If 
these were incompletely predictable, the government would generally overaccommodate in 
order to avoid the permanent effects on output that negative shocks produce under the 
DS convention. This, in turn, would cause an inflationary bias - but only temporarily: 
once the inflation level would exceed a certain level, or once output would be affected, the 
government would be forced to implement a costly disinflation even without an arbitrary 
change in convention.
There are also other ways in which the analysis o f this section could be extended. It 
is interesting to see what effects the modifications of the standard monetary policy game 
would produce under the DS convention. Following BG. a first step would be to include 
reputational effects by allowing the private sector to play trigger strategies in an infi­
nite horizon framework. However, a fundamental problem would arise: would changes in 




























































































could happen: the multiplicity of (trigger strategy) equilibria which resulted from the BG 
framework would be combined with an infinite number of possible conventions. Second, 
one could allow for asymmetric information, as in Backus and Driffill (1985), Cuckiermari 
and Meltzer (1986), and Basar and Salmon (1990). But under the DS convention, the 
issue of the type of a policymaker is less important as many types would be indistin­
guishable anyway. For example, both Backus and Driffill’s “hard-nosed” and “soft-nosed” 
policymakers would generally implement a zero inflation strategy under discretion. Note 
moreover that even in cases where a distinction is possible the “tough” policymaker would 
prefer not to be credible and to be considered “soft” , since an unexpected disinflation 
affects prices sooner than an expected disinflation.
It should be remembered that the DS convention discussed in this section is just one 
possible modification of the standard model. It is o f particular interest, because its results 
are so fundamentally different —  and because this difference is caused by a simple variation 
on the standard model. But other variations are possible. A logical first step would be to 
set c =  1 in equation (20), effectively lifting the “ hysteresis” phenomenon from the expec­
tation formation process. The permanent effect of stabilization policy on unemployment 
depends entirely on the pessimistic nature of the DS convention; and in effect we observe 
that several countries outside Western Europe, notably the US, did not witness such a 
permanent effect on unemployment even though they suffered similar ’’ disinflation reces­
sions” during the early 1980s. The model under consideration is thus capable o f explaining 
differences in behaviour between economies by allowing for differences in conventions.
At this point one could object that absolutely anything could be explained by intro­
ducing arbitrary conventions. This is only partially true. In reality conventions do exist, 
they differ between different groups, and usually they are not arbitrary. Economic agents 
do find ways of coordinating their actions. Firms use pricing rules, unions stick to certain 
principles in wage negotiations, and do so on sensible grounds. Different societies may 
have different rules. Conventions may change over time, and even more significantly, these 
changes may be brought about by the economic policy implemented by the government18. 
For example, private agents quickly change their conventional behaviour under hyperin­
flations: wages are first indexed yearly, then monthly, then weekly, etcetera. Less extreme 
economic policies, such as those that generate a moderate level o f inflation, may affect 
this conventional structure much more slowly; nevertheless, it would be a mistake for any 
economic planner to take the stability of beliefs, conventions, and ultimately institutions, 
for granted.
18The interaction between the evolution of private sector conventions and government credibil­





























































































The objective of this paper has been in some sense to warn against the use o f oversimplified 
models of economic policymaking. The primary aim has been to show that the standard 
BG framework of monetary policy gives a misleadingly simple impression as regards to the 
role of credibility in relation to economic policy. To this end, we modified the BG model 
by implicitly allowing for capital investment, and showed that then the standard “ Lucas 
supply” structure can be considered a special case, the outcome o f just one out of many 
possible conventions that serve to coordinate the expectations of atomistic private agents. 
It was seen that if another “opposing” convention is in force, both the ex ante and e.r post 
optimal policy will be different in equilibrium. A “tough” reputation, that is a perceived 
commitment to zero-inflation, is counterproductive if this alternative convention prevails.
This simple example makes clear that credibility, in itself, is not sufficient as a means 
o f solving the time-inconsistency problem if the private sector does not have a unique 
rational expectation. Hence the warning: before committing itself, the government must 
know what its ex ante optimal policy is — and. in general, this may be anything, depending 
on the convention which the private sector uses to coordinate its expectations.
The second aim of the paper was to offer an alternative model o f disinflation policy. It 
has been argued that this alternative model succeeds in explaining several empirical facts 
which contradict the Lucas supply thesis, and that it does so without relying on arbitrary 
assumptions of nominal wage rigidity and staggered contracts19. Moreover, local variations 
in “pricing” conventions may help to explain differences in disinflation experiences between 
countries.
19The model is however capable of dealing with these phenomena as well. As noted in section 
2, the fact that the expected market-clearing wage depends on the pricing convention in force 
creates a “moral hazard” problem: producers could try to lower nominal wages by overstating 
their pessimism. This in turn could prevent nominal wages from adapting quickly to new market­
clearing levels: this new level will have to gain credibility first. Thus, even though the model 
does not need sticky wages in order to explain recessions, it can easily be adapted in order to 






























































































PROOF PROPOSITION 1: The government will only set m, =  x" <  A if the discounted 
costs o f this disinflationary policy under precommitment are less than the costs of remain­
ing in the initial equilibrium.
From (22) and table 4 it then follows that this requires:
AA2 +  +  £  AT[x ' 2 +  £T] <  £  VI A2 +  {B)
t = 2  t =1
Substituting B +  A — tt’  =  F and rearranging gives f (A  — 7r“ ) <  A(A2 — *'*)■ The 
government minimizes its loss function (22) by choosing a value for money growth mt =  x" 
(f >  <j) that maximizes this difference with the costs in the original situation. Therefore:
max{A(A2 — x '2) — £(A — tt’  )}
Given that 0 <  x" <  A. it follow's that x" =  ^  for A > ^  and tt' =  A otherwise. This 
concludes the proof □
PROOF PROPOSITION 2: From (22) and Table 5 it follows that the government will 
have an incentive to set its unexpected rate of inflation. x°. as low as possible subject to 
the condition in (23). We can rewrite (23) as:
x° >  x ' -  ^ ( . 4 -  x") -  ((l+(;/r))/<;0)B
Since B  >  0 and 0 <  x* <  .4 in case of a disinflation, it follows that the lowest possible 
value for x° will equal x ' if and only if x* =  A and B =  0. For all x" <  A there exists a 
x° <  x ’ , such that the government will set x° when the private sector expects x". Since 
the private sector knows the government’s objective function, the ex ante optimal rate of 
inflation x* will then not be credible. This concludes the proof. □
PROOF COROLLARY 1: It follows from (22) and table 5 that in general the govern­
ment will have an incentive for a large disinflation —  so that (23) no longer holds — if the 
costs of such a policy are lower than those for the lowest possible value of money growth 
given that (23) holds. Therefore:
A (A +  x ' -  x -)2 +  £  AT [x12 +  £r] > A (A +  x " -  x ’ )2 +  ]T  AT[(x°)2 -  tfl]
T—2 7  — 2
where x ' indicates the optimal rate of inflation given (23), and x" is the (lower) optimal 
rate of inflation if (23) no longer holds. Assuming T  is large so that J2l=o AT — yry we 
obtain after some rearranging:




























































































Now consider the boundary case in which x" =  jt' =  A (therefore B — 0 and A < £/2A). 
Substituting the expressions for fi and T and rearranging gives:
A2 -  (7r")2 > iK 0 (A  -  t")
The question is whether a x" exists such that this holds and 0 <  x" <  A. Solving the 
equation it follows that this is true when < A. This concludes the proof.
PROOF PROPOSITION 3: The proof is structured as follows: it will first be proved 
that m, =  A for A < and B  =  0, and m, =  0 in all other cases are the only credible 
rates of money growth for the government. Subsequently. it will be proved that these are 
also the optimal rates of money growth.
It follows from the proof of proposition 2 that the government will have an incentive 
to implement a rate of money growth m, =  x° which is smaller than the expected rate 
. - 1* ?  =  x ” if B >  0, and/or if 0 <  x" <  A. Hence, in this case, the only credible rate 
of money growth if the private sector knows the government objectives (so that x ” =  x°) 
is rht =  0 for all t >  t\. If, instead, x* =  A and 5 = 0 ,  there are two possibilities: we 
know from Corollary 1 that if A >  there will exist a rate of money growth x° <  .4 
such that unexpected implementation of this rate is welfare-improving. Thus, if A < ^  
(from propositions 1 and 2 we know that this is the necessary condition for x “ =  A ) and 
A > there will exist a x° <  A. But then if =  x* =  x° it follows again from
proposition 2 that the only credible rate of money growth equals zero in this case. Instead, 
if A < the government will have no incentive to set money growth below its expected 
level: (.im j' =  x“ =  rfi( =  x° =  A. This concludes the first part of the proof.
Now, what is the optimal rate of money growth? It follows directly from above that the 
credible rate of money growth mt =  x" =  A is also the optimal rate if A < and 5  =  0: 
there is no incentive to implement a lower rate of money growth. If m, =  x ’  =  0. would 
the government not prefer to implement a non-c.redible (higher) rate of money growth? 
The answer to this is a clear "n o” , as can be seen from the table which gives the outcome 
of a monetary policy in which the government implements rh, =  x for all t >  t\ whereas 
the private sector expects rhct =  0 for all / >
Comparing this table with table 2 (a fully expected full disinflation) it is easy to see 
that it is always preferable to set x =  0, so that actual money growth equals expected 





























































































to ~ ' h <„
i, +  A ) / 0 - ( B  +  A  +  * ) / 0 —( D  +  A  - f  nTr)/0
Vt - B - B - A - ( B  +  A  +  tt)
P t 0 A  +  rr A  +  ( 2 n  — 1 )if
.4 A  +  T 2 i f
z t A 2 ( if  +  A ) 2 ( 2 i f ) 2
M B H ( A  +  B ) +f(.4  +  B  +  n r )
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